CVE-2026-33731: AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data
Summary The Authorize.Net webhook handler at plugin/AuthorizeNet/webhook.php contains a signature verification bypass that allows an attacker to forge webhook requests with arbitrary payment amounts and target user IDs.
Published Jun 22, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 28.0
- Fixed in
- 29.0
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The Authorize.Net webhook handler at plugin/AuthorizeNet/webhook.php contains a signature verification bypass that allows an attacker to forge webhook requests with arbitrary payment amounts and target user IDs. By supplying a valid transaction ID from a small legitimate purchase, the attacker bypasses signature validation and credits arbitrary wallet balances to any user account via attacker-controlled payload fields.
Details
Three flaws combine into an exploit chain:
1. Signature Bypass via OR Logic (webhook.php:33)
if (!$parsed['signatureValid'] && (empty($txnInfo) || !empty($txnInfo['error']))) {
http_response_code(401);
echo 'invalid signature';
exit;
}The webhook is rejected only when both conditions are true: the signature is invalid AND the transaction lookup fails. If the attacker supplies a real transaction ID (e.g., from their own $1 purchase), getTransactionDetails() succeeds and returns valid data, so the second condition is false. The invalid signature is silently ignored.
2. Payload Values Override API-Fetched Values (AuthorizeNet.php:169-171, webhook.php:44-48)
In analyzeTransactionFromWebhook(), users_id and amount are extracted from the attacker-controlled webhook payload first:
$users_id = isset($metadata['users_id']) ? (int)$metadata['users_id'] : null;
$amount = isset($payload['amount']) ? (float)$payload['amount'] : ...;The fallback logic in webhook.php only applies when the analysis values are empty/falsy:
if (!$analysis['users_id'] && !empty($txnInfo['users_id'])) {
$analysis['users_id'] = (int)$txnInfo['users_id'];
}
if (!$analysis['amount'] && isset($txnInfo['amount'])) {
$analysis['amount'] = (float)$txnInfo['amount'];
}Since the forged payload already provides both values, the authoritative API-fetched values are never used.
3. Missing Approval Check (webhook.php:61-75)
The code checks only that users_id and amount are non-empty before calling processSinglePayment(). The isApproved field is computed in analyzeTransactionFromWebhook() (line 222-228) but never verified before crediting the wallet at line 68-75.
PoC
Prerequisites: Attacker has a low-privileged account on the AVideo instance and has made at least one legitimate small Authorize.Net purchase (e.g., $1.00), noting the transaction ID (e.g., 60123456789).
- Immediately after the purchase completes (to race the legitimate webhook), send a forged webhook:
curl -X POST https://target.com/plugin/AuthorizeNet/webhook.php \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
"eventType": "net.authorize.payment.authcapture.created",
"payload": {
"id": "60123456789",
"amount": 99999.99,
"responseCode": 1,
"metadata": {
"users_id": 2
}
}
}'- The signature check fails (no
X-ANET-Signatureheader), butgetTransactionDetails('60123456789')succeeds because it is a real transaction. The OR condition on line 33 is not fully satisfied, so execution continues.
analyzeTransactionFromWebhook()uses the forged payload'samount: 99999.99andmetadata.users_id: 2.
processSinglePayment()credits $99,999.99 to user ID 2's wallet viaaddBalance().
- The dedup key is
sha1('net.authorize.payment.authcapture.created' . '60123456789'), so the legitimate webhook arriving later is silently discarded as a duplicate.
- The attacker can repeat with new transaction IDs from additional small purchases for cumulative balance inflation.
Impact
- Wallet balance inflation: Attacker credits arbitrary amounts to any user's wallet without corresponding payment, bypassing the payment gateway's actual charge amount.
- Premium content access: Inflated wallet balance allows purchasing all paid/premium video content without real payment.
- Subscription fraud: By including
plans_idin forged metadata, the attacker can activate premium subscriptions (webhook.php:86-134) without corresponding payment. - Financial loss: Platform owner loses revenue from fraudulently accessed premium content and services.
Recommended Fix
1. Reject webhooks with invalid signatures unconditionally — the transaction lookup should only be used for data enrichment *after* signature validation passes:
// webhook.php line 33 — FIX: reject on invalid signature alone
if (!$parsed['signatureValid']) {
_error_log('[Authorize.Net webhook] Bad signature');
http_response_code(401);
echo 'invalid signature';
exit;
}2. Use API-fetched values as authoritative — in webhook.php lines 44-55, invert the precedence so $txnInfo values always override payload values:
// Always prefer API-fetched values over payload values
if (!empty($txnInfo['users_id'])) {
$analysis['users_id'] = (int)$txnInfo['users_id'];
}
if (isset($txnInfo['amount'])) {
$analysis['amount'] = (float)$txnInfo['amount'];
}3. Check `isApproved` before processing — add a gate before processSinglePayment():
if (!$analysis['isApproved']) {
_error_log('[Authorize.Net webhook] Transaction not approved');
http_response_code(400);
echo 'transaction not approved';
exit;
}Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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