CVE-2026-76893: tsParticles: A single anonymous MCP session can monopolize HTTP mode and deny new clients
The HTTP mode of @tsparticles/mcp-server shares one stateful transport between all clients. The first anonymous client that sends initialize claims it, and every later client is refused until the process restarts. This is a denial of service, fixed in 4.3.2. Versions before 4.3.2 are affected, including 4.3.1.
Published Nov 9, 2026 · Analysis Nov 9, 2026
What an attacker can do
The server creates a single StreamableHTTPServerTransport before it accepts requests, and passes every request to it. After the first successful initialize, the transport holds that session's state. A second client that sends initialize without an mcp-session-id gets HTTP 400 with the JSON-RPC error Invalid Request: Server already initialized.
The reporter reproduced this three times out of three on v4.3.0, and found the same pattern in v4.3.1 and main at the time. No authentication is involved, so any remote client that wins the race can hold the slot. The first session keeps working. All other legitimate clients, including AI agents that rely on this MCP server for tools, cannot start a session until someone restarts the process. The impact is availability only, and it is limited to new sessions. A client can do this once at startup, with no need to keep sending traffic.
Who is affected
@tsparticles/mcp-server before 4.3.2 in HTTP mode. The advisory confirms 4.3.0 and says 4.3.1 and main had the same singleton transport. Check your install:
npm ls @tsparticles/mcp-serverA quick test is to send two initialize requests without a session id. If the second one returns Server already initialized, the instance is vulnerable.
@tsparticles/mcp-server
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 4.3.2
- Fixed in
- 4.3.2
- Check
npm ls @tsparticles/mcp-server
How to fix it
Upgrade to 4.3.2:
npm install @tsparticles/[email protected]The fix is commit d3b5672bd61bb847abfa21193c34eabf7aba6896. It keeps a map from session id to its own transport. A request with an mcp-session-id goes to that session's transport, and an unknown id gets a 404. A request without an id creates a new transport. A routing transport sends each reply back to the session that made the request, and closed sessions are removed.
The sources list no workaround. Because the 4.3.1 release fixed other problems in the same server, plan to move straight to 4.3.2.
How to tell if you were hit
Look for HTTP 400 responses to POST /mcp containing Invalid Request: Server already initialized, which legitimate clients will report in their own logs. Check which client holds the first session: an initialize from an unexpected clientInfo name or source address at server start suggests that an outsider took the slot. If clients cannot connect while the server process is up, restart it and then upgrade.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The HTTP mode of @tsparticles/mcp-server creates a single stateful StreamableHTTPServerTransport instance and reuses it for all clients. The first anonymous client that initializes the MCP endpoint claims the shared transport state, and later clients cannot create their own sessions.
This was verified on v4.3.0 at commit 0266d469aa2d719cb66a9c6bf09aded4186ec17c. The same singleton transport pattern is still present in v4.3.1 and current main.
Affected Code
The server creates one shared transport before accepting requests:
const transport = new StreamableHTTPServerTransport({ sessionIdGenerator: () => randomUUID(), });
const httpServer = createServer(async (req, res) => { ... await transport.handleRequest(req, res, parsedBody); });
Because the same transport object is reused across all requests, the first successful initialize call changes the state for all later clients.
Reproduction
Send two independent initialize requests without a prior mcp-session-id.
First request:
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-11-25","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"first-client","version":"1.0.0"}}}
Second request:
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-11-25","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"second-client","version":"1.0.0"}}}
Observed result in 3 out of 3 runs:
first response: HTTP 200 with mcp-session-id second response: HTTP 400 {"jsonrpc":"2.0","error":{"code":-32600,"message":"Invalid Request: Server already initialized"},"id":null}
Impact
An unauthenticated remote client can win the first-session race and prevent all later legitimate clients from establishing new MCP sessions until the process is restarted. The first session remains functional, but new clients are denied service.
Recommendation
Create a transport per session or maintain a bounded session-id-to-transport map. Do not reuse one stateful transport instance for all HTTP clients.
Credited to NetKingJ.
Questions
- Does upgrading to 4.3.1 fix CVE-2026-76893?
No. The advisory says the singleton transport pattern is still present in 4.3.1 and main. The patched version is 4.3.2.
- Does the attacker see other users' data?
No source says so. The impact is denial of service: later clients cannot create sessions. The first session continues to work.
- Does it need authentication or user interaction?
Neither. A remote anonymous client only needs to send the first initialize request to the HTTP endpoint.
- Is it exploited in the wild?
No source we read reports exploitation, and the entry has no CISA KEV record.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
More Other MCP servers and tools vulnerabilities
All Other MCP servers and tools entriesCVE-2026-77312
Flyto2 Core: Arbitrary file write via unguarded data.*/file.* modules (incomplete fix of CVE-2026-67429)
critical10.0Nov 20, 2026CVE-2026-77318
Jupyter MCP Server: Unauthenticated management routes can hijack the Jupyter backend in standalone HTTP mode
high7.3Nov 20, 2026CVE-2026-77359
Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes
critical9.3Nov 20, 2026CVE-2026-130007
k8s-mcp-server: Missing authentication on default SSE/HTTP transport allows unauthenticated Kubernetes tool execution
high7.9Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-130008
sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table
high8.2Nov 19, 2026CVE-2026-62964
Gortex: Arbitrary file write / repo-confinement escape in `write_file` / `edit_file` / `move_inline` MCP tools → code execution
high7.8Nov 19, 2026
