GHSA-5fqc-mrg8-w798: Dulwich: Symlink directory traversal in filter-branch index_filter via cross-commit state persistence
Summary Dulwich's filterbranch.py CommitFilter.applyindexfilter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.
Published Oct 2, 2026
Affected packages
dulwich
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 0.23.1, <= 1.2.7
- Fixed in
- 1.2.8
- Check
pip show dulwich
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Dulwich's filter_branch.py CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.
Root Cause
_apply_index_filter() at dulwich/filter_branch.py:212 calls build_index_from_tree(".", tmp_index_path, ...) which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The finally block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (os.unlink(tmp_index_path)) — NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When process_commit() processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits.
On dulwich 1.2.7, build_file_from_blob() has no symlink protection, and validate_path_element only validates name patterns, not filesystem state.
Impact
An attacker can craft a malicious repository where running filter_branch with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets .git/hooks/.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker creates a repository where commit history (linearized) has:
- Ancestor commit: tree entry
evil(mode 120000, symlink →/target_dir) - Descendant commit: tree entry
evil/payload(mode 100644, attacker content) - Victim clones repository and runs
filter_branchwith an index filter process_commit()processes ancestor first → materializesevilas symlink to/target_dirin CWD- CWD is NOT cleaned between commits
- Processing descendant:
os.path.exists("./evil")→ True (symlink exists).build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "./evil/payload")→open("./evil/payload", "wb")follows intermediate symlink → writes to/target_dir/payload
Suggested Fix
Clean the CWD between commit iterations in _apply_index_filter(), or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files.
Reported by zx (Jace)
Credited to manus-use, jelmer.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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