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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

GHSA-5fqc-mrg8-w798: Dulwich: Symlink directory traversal in filter-branch index_filter via cross-commit state persistence

highCVSS 3.1 8.6

Summary Dulwich's filterbranch.py CommitFilter.applyindexfilter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.

Published Oct 2, 2026

Affected packages

dulwich

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 0.23.1, <= 1.2.7
Fixed in
1.2.8
Check
pip show dulwich

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Dulwich's filter_branch.py CommitFilter._apply_index_filter() is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal. When processing commit history, materialized tree entries (including symlinks) persist in the working directory between commits, allowing a symlink from an ancestor commit to redirect file writes from a descendant commit to arbitrary filesystem locations.

Root Cause

_apply_index_filter() at dulwich/filter_branch.py:212 calls build_index_from_tree(".", tmp_index_path, ...) which materializes all tree entries to the current working directory. The finally block (line 229-230) only cleans up the temporary index file (os.unlink(tmp_index_path)) — NOT the filesystem files written to CWD. When process_commit() processes parents recursively first (line 260), files materialized from ancestor commits persist and affect processing of descendant commits.

On dulwich 1.2.7, build_file_from_blob() has no symlink protection, and validate_path_element only validates name patterns, not filesystem state.

Impact

An attacker can craft a malicious repository where running filter_branch with an index filter writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations via symlink traversal. This achieves RCE if the write targets .git/hooks/.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker creates a repository where commit history (linearized) has:
  2. Ancestor commit: tree entry evil (mode 120000, symlink → /target_dir)
  3. Descendant commit: tree entry evil/payload (mode 100644, attacker content)
  4. Victim clones repository and runs filter_branch with an index filter
  5. process_commit() processes ancestor first → materializes evil as symlink to /target_dir in CWD
  6. CWD is NOT cleaned between commits
  7. Processing descendant: os.path.exists("./evil") → True (symlink exists). build_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "./evil/payload") → open("./evil/payload", "wb") follows intermediate symlink → writes to /target_dir/payload

Suggested Fix

Clean the CWD between commit iterations in _apply_index_filter(), or verify that no intermediate path components are symlinks before writing files.

Reported by zx (Jace)

Credited to manus-use, jelmer.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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