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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

GHSA-8w8g-wq8h-fq33: Dulwich: Symlink write-through in checkout(paths=[]) via raw os.open bypasses all symlink protections

highCVSS 3.1 8.6

Summary Dulwich's porcelain.checkout(paths=[...]) code path writes files using raw os.open(filepath, OWRONLYOCREATOTRUNC, mode) followed by f.write(obj.data). This code path does NOT call buildfilefromblob() at all, completely bypassing any symlink protections (including the unreleased d09f8af fix).

Published Oct 2, 2026

Affected packages

dulwich

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 0.24.0, <= 1.2.7
Fixed in
1.2.8
Check
pip show dulwich

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Dulwich's porcelain.checkout(paths=[...]) code path writes files using raw os.open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, mode) followed by f.write(obj.data). This code path does NOT call build_file_from_blob() at all, completely bypassing any symlink protections (including the unreleased d09f8af fix). os.open without O_NOFOLLOW follows symlinks at both the target file and intermediate directories, allowing arbitrary file writes.

Root Cause

At dulwich/porcelain/__init__.py:5661-5675, the checkout(paths=[...]) implementation:

file_path = _checked_worktree_path(r, path)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(file_path), exist_ok=True)
flags = os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC
with os.fdopen(os.open(file_path, flags, mode), "wb") as f:
    f.write(obj.data)

_checked_worktree_path() (line 601-631) only performs name validation — checking that the path doesn't start with / or \\ and that components pass INVALID_DOTNAMES checks. It performs zero filesystem symlink detection.

Impact

An attacker can craft a malicious repository that, when a victim clones it and runs checkout(paths=[...]), writes attacker-controlled content (with attacker-controlled permissions) to any filesystem location accessible to the user. Writing to .git/hooks/post-checkout achieves RCE on the next git checkout.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker creates a repository where HEAD has trigger as a symlink (mode 120000, content ../../.git/hooks/post-checkout), and tag v1.0 has trigger as an executable file (mode 100755, content #!/bin/sh\nmalicious_payload)
  2. Victim clones the repository — worktree has trigger → ../../.git/hooks/post-checkout (a symlink)
  3. Victim runs porcelain.checkout(repo, target="v1.0", paths=["trigger"]) to restore a specific file from a tag
  4. _checked_worktree_path(r, "trigger") passes — name validation only, no symlink check
  5. os.open("trigger", O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0o755) follows the symlink → opens .git/hooks/post-checkout for writing
  6. f.write(obj.data) writes the malicious payload to the hook
  7. Next checkout operation triggers the hook → RCE

Suggested Fix

Replace the raw os.open path with a call to build_file_from_blob (once that function is hardened against intermediate symlinks), or add explicit symlink detection: resolve the path with os.path.realpath() and verify it stays within the worktree root before opening.

Reported by zx (Jace)

Credited to manus-use, jelmer.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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