GHSA-cm62-gvxx-vmxx: Dulwich: Symlink directory traversal in stash pop allows arbitrary file write via intermediate directory symlinks
Summary Dulwich's stash.py:pop() function is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary files outside the repository worktree when a victim pops a stash in a malicious repository. Root Cause The pop() function at dulwich/stash.py:236 uses os.path.exists(parentdir) to check if a parent directory exists before writing stashed files.
Published Oct 2, 2026
Affected packages
dulwich
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 0.22.5, <= 1.2.7
- Fixed in
- 1.2.8
- Check
pip show dulwich
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Dulwich's stash.py:pop() function is vulnerable to symlink directory traversal, allowing an attacker to write arbitrary files outside the repository worktree when a victim pops a stash in a malicious repository.
Root Cause
The pop() function at dulwich/stash.py:236 uses os.path.exists(parent_dir) to check if a parent directory exists before writing stashed files. os.path.exists() follows symlinks, so when an intermediate directory in the path is a symlink pointing outside the worktree (e.g., link → ../../.git/hooks), the check passes and subsequent file writes resolve through the symlink.
The validate_path() function (line 228) only validates path component names against INVALID_DOTNAMES — it performs zero filesystem symlink detection. On dulwich 1.2.7 (latest release), build_file_from_blob() has no symlink protection whatsoever.
Impact
An attacker can craft a malicious repository that, when a victim clones it and performs a stash pop operation, writes attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations. Writing to .git/hooks/post-checkout achieves Remote Code Execution on the victim's machine on the next git checkout operation.
Attack Scenario
- Attacker creates a repository with branch
maincontaininglink(symlink →../../.git/hooks) and branchfeaturecontaininglink/post-checkout(executable payload) - Victim clones the repository (landing on
main— symlinklinkexists in worktree) - Victim checks out
feature, makes changes, runsstash.push() - Victim checks out
main(restoring thelinksymlink) - Victim runs
stash.pop(0)— stash containslink/post-checkout os.path.exists("link")returns True (symlink to existing directory),os.makedirsskippedbuild_file_from_blob(blob, mode, "link/post-checkout")→open("link/post-checkout", "wb")follows the intermediate symlink → payload written to.git/hooks/post-checkout- Next checkout operation triggers the hook → RCE
Suggested Fix
Before writing any file, verify that no component of the target path resolves through a symlink outside the worktree. Use os.path.realpath(parent_dir) and confirm it stays within the repository root. Alternatively, use os.open() with O_NOFOLLOW on each path component.
Reported by zx (Jace)
Credited to manus-use, jelmer.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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