CVE-2026-33035: Unauthenticated Reflected XSS via innerHTML in AVideo
Summary AVideo contains a reflected XSS vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim's browser. User input from a URL parameter flows through PHP's jsonencode() into a JavaScript function that renders it via innerHTML, bypassing encoding and achieving full script execution. Root Cause The vulnerability is caused by two issues working together: 1.
Published Mar 17, 2026 · Updated Mar 20, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 25.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
AVideo contains a reflected XSS vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript in a victim's browser. User input from a URL parameter flows through PHP's json_encode() into a JavaScript function that renders it via innerHTML, bypassing encoding and achieving full script execution.
Root Cause
The vulnerability is caused by two issues working together:
1. Source: Unescaped user input passed to JavaScript (videoNotFound.php)
File: view/videoNotFound.php line 49
if (!empty($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg'])) {
echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg']) . ');';
}PHP's json_encode() with default flags only escapes quotes (" → \") and backslashes. It does NOT escape HTML special characters (<, >, /). The resulting string contains raw HTML tags that are passed directly to JavaScript.
2. Sink: innerHTML renders HTML tags as executable DOM (script.js)
File: view/js/script.js
function avideoAlertInfo(msg) { // line ~1891
avideoAlert("", msg, 'info'); // calls ↓
}
function avideoAlert(title, msg, type) { // line ~1270
avideoAlertHTMLText(title, msg, type); // calls ↓
}
function avideoAlertHTMLText(title, msg, type) { // line ~1451
var span = document.createElement("span");
span.innerHTML = msg; // line 1464 — XSS SINK
swal({ content: span });
}innerHTML parses the string as HTML. Any `, `, or other HTML tags with event handlers are instantiated as real DOM elements, triggering JavaScript execution.
Data Flow
URL parameter (?404ErrorMsg=PAYLOAD)
→ $_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg']
→ json_encode() ← does NOT escape < > /
→ avideoAlertInfo()
→ avideoAlert()
→ avideoAlertHTMLText()
→ span.innerHTML = msg ← renders HTML tags, executes JS---
Proof of Concept
https://localhost/view/videoNotFound.php?404ErrorMsg=The page renders:
avideoAlertInfo("");Which flows to span.innerHTML = "". The browser creates an ` element, src=x fails to load, onerror fires alert(document.domain)`.
Affected Code
| File | Line | Issue | | `view/videoNotFound.php` | 49 | `json_encode()` does not escape `<` `>` for HTML context | | `view/js/script.js` | 1464 | `span.innerHTML = msg` renders user input as HTML | | `view/js/script.js` | 1282 | `span.innerHTML = msg` in `avideoAlertWithCookie()` | | `view/js/script.js` | 1335 | `span.innerHTML = __(msg,true)` in `avideoConfirm()` | | `view/js/script.js` | 1358 | `span.innerHTML = msg` in `avideoAlertOnceForceConfirm()` |
The innerHTML sink exists in 4 functions. Any future code that passes user input to avideoAlertInfo(), avideoAlertWarning(), avideoAlertDanger(), or avideoAlertSuccess() will create additional XSS vectors.
Remediation
Fix 1: Escape HTML in PHP (source fix)
// view/videoNotFound.php line 49
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg']) . ');';
// AFTER (fixed):
echo 'avideoAlertInfo(' . json_encode($_REQUEST['404ErrorMsg'], JSON_HEX_TAG | JSON_HEX_AMP) . ');';JSON_HEX_TAG converts < → \u003C and > → \u003E, preventing HTML injection.
Fix 2: Use textContent instead of innerHTML (sink fix, recommended)
// view/js/script.js - all alert functions
// BEFORE (vulnerable):
span.innerHTML = msg;
// AFTER (fixed):
span.textContent = msg;textContent treats the string as plain text — HTML tags are displayed literally, never parsed or executed.
Fix 3: Add Content-Security-Policy header (defense in depth)
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'Impact
- Session hijacking — steal
PHPSESSIDcookie (not HttpOnly by default) - Account takeover — use stolen session to change password or email
- Phishing — inject a realistic login form inside the SweetAlert modal
- Worm propagation — inject self-spreading payloads via comments/messages
- Admin compromise — send crafted link to admin, steal session, gain full control
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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