CVE-2026-34362: AVideo's WebSocket Token Never Expires Due to Commented-Out Timeout Validation in verifyTokenSocket()
Summary The verifyTokenSocket() function in plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php has its token timeout validation commented out, causing WebSocket tokens to never expire despite being generated with a 12-hour timeout. This allows captured or legitimately obtained tokens to provide permanent WebSocket access, even after user accounts are deleted, banned, or demoted from admin.
Published Mar 30, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 26.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The verifyTokenSocket() function in plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php has its token timeout validation commented out, causing WebSocket tokens to never expire despite being generated with a 12-hour timeout. This allows captured or legitimately obtained tokens to provide permanent WebSocket access, even after user accounts are deleted, banned, or demoted from admin. Admin tokens grant access to real-time connection data for all online users including IP addresses, browser info, and page locations.
Details
WebSocket tokens are generated via getEncryptedInfo() which calls getToken(43200) to create a token with a 12-hour expiration window. The token is encrypted and contains security-critical claims: isAdmin, from_users_id, user_name, IP, browser, and device ID.
The regular HTTP token verification at objects/functions.php:3437-3439 enforces the timeout:
// objects/functions.php:3437-3439
if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
_error_log("verifyToken token timout...");
return false; // <-- enforced
}But the WebSocket-specific verification at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:65-82 has the enforcement commented out:
// plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80
if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
//_error_log("verifyToken token timout...");
//return false; // <-- NOT enforced, always falls through to return true
}
return true;Execution flow:
- Client connects to WebSocket with
?webSocketToken=TOKENin URL query onOpen()(Message.php:34) callsgetDecryptedInfo($wsocketGetVars['webSocketToken'])(line 48)getDecryptedInfo()(functions.php:49) decrypts the token and callsverifyTokenSocket($json->token)(line 54)verifyTokenSocket()validates the salt (passes) but the timeout check at line 77 evaluates the condition without acting on failure —return falseis commented out- Function returns
true— connection established with all token claims (isAdmin,from_users_id) trusted
Impact amplification via isAdmin:
When a connection has isAdmin=true (from token, Message.php:58), the getTotals() function (Message.php:419-432) includes detailed data about every connected client in periodic broadcast messages:
// Message.php:419-432
if ($isAdmin) {
$index = md5($client['selfURI']);
// Exposes: selfURI, yptDeviceId, users_id, user_name, browser, ip, location
$return['users_uri'][$index][$client['yptDeviceId']][$client['users_id']] = $client;
}Additionally, the webSocketToken message type (Message.php:212-217) allows anonymous connections (users_id=0) to upgrade their identity by providing a captured token, meaning stolen tokens work from new connections indefinitely.
The 10-minute inactivity timeout (Message.php:135-143) is not a mitigation — it only closes idle connections and resets on every message (line 243).
PoC
# Step 1: Obtain a WebSocket token as any authenticated user
curl -s -b 'PHPSESSID=VALID_SESSION' \
'https://target.com/plugin/YPTSocket/getWebSocket.json.php' | jq -r '.webSocketToken'
# Save as TOKEN=<output>
# Step 2: Wait for the token to expire (>12 hours)
# In a real scenario, the attacker already has a previously captured token
# Step 3: Connect with the expired token — succeeds because verifyTokenSocket() skips timeout
wscat -c 'ws://target.com:8888/?webSocketToken=TOKEN'
# Step 4: Verify the connection is established and receiving broadcasts
# The server will send periodic getTotals data
# Step 5: If the token was from an admin, the getTotals response includes
# all connected clients' selfURI, IP, browser, device ID, user_name, and location
# Step 6: Any user can also enumerate connected users without admin:
# Send: {"msg":"getClientsList","webSocketToken":"TOKEN"}
# Response includes all users_id, isAdmin status, and usernamesScenario: Demoted admin retains permanent admin WebSocket access
- Admin user obtains WebSocket token (contains
isAdmin: true) - Admin is demoted to regular user via the web interface
- Admin's WebSocket token still works indefinitely — the
isAdminclaim in the token is never re-validated - Demoted user continues receiving all connected users' IPs, locations, and browsing activity
Impact
- Permanent access after credential revocation: Deleted, banned, or suspended users retain WebSocket access with their original identity and privilege level, undermining account lifecycle management.
- Privilege persistence after demotion: Admin users who are demoted retain admin-level WebSocket access indefinitely. The
isAdminflag baked into the token is never re-checked against the database. - Real-time surveillance via admin tokens: Admin-level tokens expose all connected users' IP addresses, geographic locations (if User_location plugin enabled), current page URLs (selfURI), browser fingerprints, and device IDs — enabling real-time tracking of user activity.
- Extended attack window for token theft: Any vulnerability that leaks a WebSocket token (XSS, log exposure, network interception) provides permanent rather than 12-hour access, significantly increasing the impact of token compromise.
- Identity hijacking: The
webSocketTokenmessage type allows using a stolen token to assume another user's identity on new connections, enabling impersonation in chat and messaging.
Recommended Fix
Uncomment the timeout enforcement in verifyTokenSocket() at plugin/YPTSocket/functions.php:77-80:
function verifyTokenSocket($token) {
global $global;
$obj = _json_decode(decryptString($token));
if (empty($obj)) {
_error_log("verifyToken invalid token");
return false;
}
if ($obj->salt !== $global['salt']) {
_error_log("verifyToken salt fail");
return false;
}
$time = time();
if (!($time >= $obj->time && $time <= $obj->timeout)) {
_error_log("verifyToken token timeout time = $time; obj->time = $obj->time; obj->timeout = $obj->timeout");
return false; // <-- uncomment this line
}
return true;
}Additionally, consider:
- Adding an admin check to the
getClientsListhandler (Message.php:219) so only admins can enumerate connected users. - Re-validating the
isAdminclaim against the database periodically rather than trusting the token claim for the lifetime of the connection.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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