CVE-2026-41061: WWBN AVideo has Stored XSS via Unanchored Duration Regex in Video Encoder Receiver
Summary The isValidDuration() regex at objects/video.php:918 uses /^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}/ without a $ end anchor, allowing arbitrary HTML/JavaScript to be appended after a valid duration prefix. The crafted duration is stored in the database and rendered without HTML escaping via echo Video::getCleanDuration() on trending pages, playlist pages, and video gallery thumbnails, resulting in stored cross-site…
Published Apr 14, 2026 · Updated Apr 24, 2026
Affected packages
wwbn/avideo
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 29.0
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
composer show wwbn/avideo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The isValidDuration() regex at objects/video.php:918 uses /^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}/ without a $ end anchor, allowing arbitrary HTML/JavaScript to be appended after a valid duration prefix. The crafted duration is stored in the database and rendered without HTML escaping via echo Video::getCleanDuration() on trending pages, playlist pages, and video gallery thumbnails, resulting in stored cross-site scripting.
Details
Input entry point: objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php:208
// Line 203-211
if (!empty($_REQUEST['duration'])) {
$video->setDuration($_REQUEST['duration']);
}Insufficient validation: objects/video.php:918
static function isValidDuration($duration) {
// ...
return preg_match('/^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}/', $duration);
// Missing $ anchor here -----------------------------------^
}The regex matches 00:00:01 at the start of the string but ignores everything after it. A payload like 00:00:01</time><time> passes validation.
No sanitization in output function: objects/video.php:3463-3480
public static function getCleanDuration($duration = "") {
$durationParts = explode(".", $duration);
$duration = $durationParts[0];
$durationParts = explode(':', $duration);
if (count($durationParts) == 1) {
return '0:00:' . static::addZero($durationParts[0]);
} elseif (count($durationParts) == 2) {
return '0:' . static::addZero($durationParts[0]) . ':' . static::addZero($durationParts[1]);
}
return $duration; // Returns full string unmodified for 3+ colon parts
}With the payload 00:00:01</time><time>, exploding by : yields 3+ parts, so the full unsanitized string is returned.
Unescaped output sinks:
view/trending.php:72:
<time class="duration"><?php echo Video::getCleanDuration($value['duration']); ?></time>view/include/playlist.php:159:
<time class="duration"><?php echo Video::getCleanDuration(@$value['duration']); ?></time>objects/video.php:7200(gallery thumbnail generation):
$img .= "<time class=\"duration\"...>" . $duration . "</time>";No Content-Security-Policy headers are set. The application uses raw PHP templates with no auto-escaping framework.
PoC
- Authenticate as a user with upload permission and obtain a
video_id_hashfor a video (visible in encoder API responses or via the upload flow).
- Send the malicious duration:
curl -X POST "https://target/objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php" \
-d "videos_id=VIDEO_ID" \
-d "video_id_hash=HASH" \
-d 'duration=00:00:01</time><time>'- The
isValidDuration()regex matches the00:00:01prefix and allows the full string to be stored.
- Visit the trending page (
/view/trending.php) or any playlist containing the poisoned video. The injected HTML breaks out of the<time>tag and theonerrorhandler executes JavaScript in the victim's browser context.
Impact
- Session hijacking: Attacker can steal session cookies of any user (including administrators) who views a page listing the poisoned video (trending, playlists, search results, channel pages).
- Account takeover: Stolen admin session cookies grant full platform control.
- Phishing: Attacker can inject fake login forms or redirect users to malicious sites.
- Worm potential: Since the XSS fires on commonly-visited listing pages (trending), it can propagate without targeted delivery — any visitor is a victim.
The attack requires only upload-level permissions (low privilege) and impacts all users who view any page rendering the poisoned video's duration (high blast radius).
Recommended Fix
Fix 1 — Anchor the regex (objects/video.php:918):
- return preg_match('/^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}/', $duration);
+ return preg_match('/^[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}:[0-9]{1,2}(\.[0-9]+)?$/', $duration);Fix 2 — HTML-escape all duration output (defense in depth):
In view/trending.php:72:
- <time class="duration"><?php echo Video::getCleanDuration($value['duration']); ?></time>
+ <time class="duration"><?php echo htmlspecialchars(Video::getCleanDuration($value['duration']), ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); ?></time>In view/include/playlist.php:159:
- <time class="duration"><?php echo Video::getCleanDuration(@$value['duration']); ?></time>
+ <time class="duration"><?php echo htmlspecialchars(Video::getCleanDuration(@$value['duration']), ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8'); ?></time>In objects/video.php:7200:
- $img .= "<time class=\"duration\"...>" . $duration . "</time>";
+ $img .= "<time class=\"duration\"...>" . htmlspecialchars($duration, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</time>";Both fixes should be applied: the regex fix prevents storage of invalid data, and the output escaping provides defense in depth against any other code path that might store unvalidated durations.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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